

Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Connectivity Constraints

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Allocation of a Graph

- ◆ Finite set of indivisible items
- ◆ Agents have additive preferences over bundles of items
- ◆ Goal: Allocate items to agents
- ◆ Items are arranged in a graph, only allowed to hand out *connected* bundles



Previously..

- ◆ *Fair Division of a Graph*
IJCAI-17, Bouveret, Cechlárová, Elkind, Igarashi, and P.
- ◆ NP-complete to decide existence of envy-free or proportional allocations, even on a path
- ◆ Tractable if there are few player types
- ◆ There always exists an MMS allocation if graph is a tree




Pareto-Optimality

- ◆ A connected allocation is PO if no other connected allocation makes someone better off and no-one worse off.
- ◆ Without connectivity, standard way of achieving this: hand each item to agent preferring it most
- ◆ MMS exists on trees, so PO + MMS exists. Can we find it efficiently?
- ◆ Wait a minute, can we find PO efficiently? we allow 0


Finding some PO allocation



On paths, version of serial dictatorship gives a PO allocation
(but welfare max. is hard)



On stars, can use matching to maximise utilitarian welfare



On general trees, NP-hard (under Turing red.) to produce any PO allocation


reduction from X3C via perfection
pathwidth 3, diameter 7

=> welf. max. hard!


How to Show NP-Hardness

- ◆ PO always exists — so how to show hardness?
- ◆ Use technique from hedonic games
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation. *GEB* (2013)
- ◆ Suppose we can show that
it is NP-complete to decide whether there is an
allocation which is *perfect*.
- ◆ Then it is NP-hard under Turing reductions to find a PO
allocation.

Forests to Trees



simple to find reduction
showing hardness for *forest*
(each player can only get one component)



try to make reduction into a star
— but center player can get two components!

solution: everything x2, then make star
— center player can only mess up one of the copies

MMS

Fair Division of a Graph [IJCAI-17]

- ◆ The maximin share of a player is

$$\text{mms}_i(I) = \max_{(P_1, \dots, P_n) \in \Pi_n} \min_{j \in [n]} u_i(P_j).$$

- ◆ Intuition: Cut into n pieces, choose last.
- ◆ Maximise over connected partitions only \Rightarrow MMS values smaller than normal
- ◆ Adaptation of a moving knife protocol produces an allocation where every player receives at least their MMS share.

PO + MMS

MMS always exists on trees.

Pareto-improvements preserve MMS.

\Rightarrow PO + MMS exists on trees.



Finding a PO + MMS allocation
is NP-hard on a path

remains hard for $\alpha \cdot \text{MMS}$
for fixed $\alpha > 0$

Proof: take forest reduction,
connect into path,
add dummy players
whose MMS guarantee
separate the pieces

PO + EF1



	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1

$\in \Sigma_2^P$
On paths, NP-hard to decide whether a
PO + EF1 allocation exists

there is bigger example
where 1's form intervals

Future Directions

- ◆ Same thing for chores
- ◆ Restricted utility classes
- ◆ Welfare maximisation (approximations)
- ◆ Local envy-freeness: only envy bundles next to yours
- ◆ Approximate efficiency? Weaker concepts than PO?